How Intel Lost $10 Billion – and the Mobile Market

This internet site may possibly gain affiliate commissions from the inbound links on this page. Phrases of use.

Update (6/1/2020): We have republished the tale down below as a dialogue of how Intel’s cell efforts eaten so a great deal of the company’s awareness, still finally arrived to naught. In the several years due to the fact this tale was posted in 2016, Intel tried to make a competitive 5G modem that would set it on the chopping edge of the new market place. Sad to say, that effort finally failed and Intel marketed its 5G modem company to Apple. Atom has continued to create as a minimal electrical power cell resolution for entry-level Home windows units and Chromebooks.

The observations on foundry versions are far more salient now than they were being in 2016. Back again then, Intel’s 10nm was only a small late and the firm was continue to regarded as to be on the chopping edge of semiconductor tech. TSMC at this time occupies that position, though Intel desires to reclaim its crown by 5nm. Back again in 2016, we once in a while listened to analysts opine that Intel should really promote its fabs and embrace the fabless design thanks to the amplified competitors from TSMC. All those whispers have only developed louder. I’m not declaring I agree with them, but it is fascinating to see how this report frames the TSMC compared to Intel fight. Back again in 2016, points appeared incredibly distinct than they do today.

The Qualcomm antitrust lawsuit disclosures paint Intel’s failure to acquire market place share in a incredibly distinct light-weight, but I have far more to say about that in Section 2 of this updated tale.

Unique Tale Down below:

Just over 4 several years in the past, we reviewed Intel’s to start with plausible smartphone, the Xolo 900. Even though it couldn’t match far more strong devices of the working day, it was a reliable first effort. More importantly, the Medfield SoC that driven the Xolo 900 was meant to be a beachhead, a harbinger, a signal of points to come.

4 several years and billions of bucks afterwards, it is now apparent that the very long-awaited ARM-compared to-x86 war will not be fought in the tablet or smartphone market place. Intel has canceled all of its publicly declared 14nm smartphone SoCs and most of its 14nm tablet SoCs that would have shipped in Android devices. The firm is diving into 5G investigate and hopes to guide the industry in developing 5G solutions. But its 3G and 4G modems are continue to developed on the 28nm process node at TSMC, even as opponents like Qualcomm move to 14nm for their individual solutions.

How did Intel regulate to commit up to $10 billion and have so small to display for it? There is no solitary, easy reply — but there are unquestionably some cigarette smoking guns. If you want to recognize what went erroneous for Intel, we require to communicate about the semiconductor industry as a full.

Of Fabs and Foundries

The semiconductor industry is dominated by 4 corporations: GlobalFoundries, Intel, Samsung, and TSMC. 3 of these corporations — GlobalFoundries, Samsung, and TSMC — are acknowledged as pure-enjoy foundries or service provider foundries. Their company design is primarily based on production silicon for other corporations, not developing and launching solutions that they promote themselves. (Samsung does make some tailor made silicon for itself, but the bulk of its foundry company will come from exterior prospects).

Contrary to the service provider foundries, Intel styles and builds equally its fabrication vegetation and its microprocessors. Until the last couple several years, Intel never ever took foundry prospects. Intel’s modern attempts to split into the service provider foundry company by attracting a handful of large-margin prospects weren’t all that productive and have still to make important profits for the firm.

The difference in between service provider foundries and IDMs (built-in machine companies) like Intel is a important aspect of why Intel’s cell efforts performed out the way they did.

Intel’s production method historically relied on quickly adopting new process technology. The bulk of the company’s profits is derived from primary-edge nodes more mature amenities were being either upgraded or shut down as they grew to become obsolete. The chart down below reveals Intel’s R&D expenditures as a share of whole product sales as compared to Samsung and TSMC:

R&D spending between semiconductor companies

TSMC pursues a incredibly distinct optimization method. Even though it also invests in primary-edge semiconductor technology, the bulk of TSMC’s profits is gained on more mature technology nodes. The chart down below is primarily based on TSMC’s Q1 2015 outcomes:


TSMC’s profits by process node

As of Q1 2015, 39 % of TSMC’s profits was gained on technology nodes it deployed 10-20 several years in the past. 54 % of its profits arrived from nodes that were being in quantity manufacturing at the very least 8 several years in the past. Intel made constrained use of more mature amenities to make its chipsets, but its company design is fundamentally distinct.

For most of 30 several years, that change did not genuinely subject. From the 1980s by 2010, Intel defeat its minimal-quantity RISC opponents and seized the data centre by leveraging the economies of scale it produced in the consumer Computer system market place. It crushed its only really serious competitor in the x86 market place and forced AMD to promote its individual fabs in an effort to survive.


Intel drove quantity in new marketplaces by exploiting economies of scale it had produced elsewhere

The pure-enjoy foundries and Intel worked in parallel tracks, typically contending with some of the very same challenges, but prioritizing and solving them in distinct methods. Intel developed its foundries to demanding expectations employing a philosophy it identified as “Copy Precisely.” It prioritized large yields, centered almost exclusively on microprocessors, and enforced rigorous design and style regulations. Intel solutions were being made to be developed at Intel foundries with Intel equipment and Intel’s recognized best methods.

In contrast, TSMC and the other service provider foundries made their process nodes to meet the needs of many distinct consumers. Their fabs prioritize throughput and flexibility although minimizing charge. The two versions worked fantastically for their respective firms — right until their firms started out to collide.

The Limits of Technological know-how

Intel’s failure to acquire traction in the cell market place highlights the flaws in managing technological progress as a roadmap for company achievement. Despite modern delays and its individual determination to abandon its tick-tock design, Intel continue to owns the most technologically innovative foundries in the earth. It’s the only firm to have deployed a correct 14nm die shrink and it’ll be the to start with firm to deploy a correct 10nm node as opposed to a 10/14 or 10/16 hybrid. All of this is correct — as is the fact that Intel expended $10 billion (in accordance to Re/code) in cell with nothing at all to display for it.

Technological know-how internet sites, like ExtremeTech, have typically talked over x86 compared to ARM or AMD versus Nvidia strictly in conditions of process node and roadmap. This performs exceptionally well when discussing developments in battery daily life or performance, but a great deal fewer well when utilized to firms who instantly locate themselves in direct competitors for the to start with time in a long time.

In Section 2 of this two-aspect collection, we focus on how Intel’s company design and advancement priorities slowed and sabotaged its potential to contend effectively in the cell earth. We also focus on why the myriad ARM-compared to-Atom debates failed to capture the serious challenges plaguing Chipzilla, and why the firm saw such constrained adoption of its solutions.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *